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§1. Introduction. 
 
 Classical India has various language sciences. Three of the six traditional 
auxiliary sciences of the Veda (vedå∫ga) — phonetics (ßik∑å), etymological explanation 
(nirukta), grammar (vyåkaraˆa) — deal with language. The various Pråtißåkhyas — 
which precede the surviving treatises of ßik∑å, and are its authentic representatives 
according to Renou1 — deal with Vedic phonetics. Vedic hermeneutics (m¥måµså), 
too, can be looked upon as a language science, and so can certain developments of 
Indian philosophical thought. But grammar was most widely studied. Grammar, 
according to the grammarian Patañjali (2nd cent. B.C.E.), is the most important among 
the six auxiliary sciences. We will therefore confine our attention to grammar 
(vyåkaraˆa) — and in particular to the oldest surviving, and most important, text of this 
genre: Påˆini's A∑†ådhyåy¥ — in its relationship to other sciences. 
 Grammar did not interact with mathematics and the natural sciences (astronomy 
and medicine), or at least not strongly.2 The suggestion that Påˆini's "linguistic zero" 
caused or influenced the introduction of zero in mathematics has no evidence to support 
it.3 Note however that the expression "natural sciences" is apt to be misleading in the 
classical Indian context: physics and part of chemistry have their closest parallels in 
what are commonly referred to as schools of Indian philosophy. Other Indian sciences, 
often without parallel in the modern world, include: etymological explanation (nirukta); 
ritual science (kalpa), like etymological explanation one of the auxiliary sciences of the 
Veda;4 Vedic hermeneutics (m¥måµså); poetic science (kåvyaßåstra). 
 Two kinds of relationship between grammar and other sciences will be primarily 
considered: (1) another science influenced grammar, and (2) grammar influenced 
                                                
* History of the Language Sciences / Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaften / Histoire des sciences du 
langage, vol. I. Ed. Sylvain Auroux, E.F.K. Koerner, Hans-Josef Niederehe, Kees Versteegh. Berlin - 
New York: Walter de Gruyter. 2000. Pp. 166-173. I thank Jan E.M. Houben for useful criticism. 
1 Renou, 1963: 167. 
2 Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat (1995) does not succeed in proving the reverse. 
3 See Ruegg, 1978. 
4 Frits Staal (1982; 1989: 349 f.) argues for the scientific status of the "science of ritual". 
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another science. In reality the interaction was often less unidirectional, and in some 
cases the bi-directional nature of the interaction will be mentioned. For the earliest 
period forms of "knowledge" that had not yet been systematised into "sciences" will 
have to be taken into consideration. 
 
 
§2. The origin of grammar. 
 
 Grammar arose in circles connected with Vedic ritual. Does it preserve traces of 
this early connection? The classical publication is Louis Renou's "Les connexions entre 
le rituel et la grammaire" (1942), which is more circumspect in its formulations than are 
some more recent publications. It draws attention to various parallels between the two 
sciences, such as the shared aphoristic (sËtra) style,5 the presence in both of general 
interpretative rules (paribhå∑å) — sometimes similar ones —, and the elements of 
vocabulary which they have in common. However, as Renou himself admits, these 
parallels do only in certain cases allow us [167] to conclude that ritual influenced 
grammar rather than vice-versa. The influence considered is moreover limited to details, 
and hardly justifies the conclusion that grammar in India owes its existence, or its 
specific nature, to ritual science. 
 One of the less doubtful antecedents of grammar is the early preoccupation with 
the correct preservation of Vedic texts. The Ùgveda, for example, has been preserved in 
many different forms of recitation, two of which are of particular interest here: the 
padapå†ha "word for word recitation" and the saµhitåpå†ha "continuous recitation". 
Neither of these two (nor indeed any of the other ones) represents the original form of 
the Ùgveda. The padapå†ha separates the words (and certain components of words) of 
the text, the saµhitåpå†ha joins them in sandhi (called saµhitå in Vedic literature and 
Påˆini's grammar). The padapå†ha of the Ùgveda is older than Påˆini (he refers to it), its 
saµhitåpå†ha appears to be younger (it applies rules of sandhi which destroy the 
original meter, where Påˆini's rules preserve it).6 The question as to how the 
saµhitåpå†ha is formed on the basis of the padapå†ha is a central concern of the 
Pråtißåkhyas, and early reflections of this nature contributed no doubt to the creation of 
grammar. Reflections about details of sandhi also gave rise to "mystical" speculations.7 
 Other aspects of grammar arose for different reasons. The Sanskrit term for 
grammar, vyåkaraˆa, provides a clue. This means literally "separation, distinction", and 
this is often taken to refer to the fact that grammar distinguishes roots, suffixes, and 
                                                
5 See also Renou, 1963: 175 f. 
6 See Bronkhorst, 1981; 1991: 75 f. 
7 E.g. Aitareya Óraˆyaka 3.2.6; Íå∫khåyana Óraˆyaka 8.11; Ùgveda Pråtißåkhya 1.2 f. 
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prefixes.8 Paul Thieme (1982: 11 [1178]) has however rightly pointed out that Påˆini's 
grammar does not analyse. This grammar rather presupposes constituent functional 
elements and shows how they are to be combined. Thieme proposes "[word-]formation" 
for vyåkaraˆa, which is not convincing. He overlooks the fact that grammar, though not 
separating the constituent elements of words, does separate words and their meanings. 
This, at any rate, is a theme that recurs a number of times in Vedic literature, frequently 
in passages that use precisely the verb vy-å-k®-, from which vyåkaraˆa is derived. These 
passages speak about the separation of name (nåman) and shape (rËpa). B®hadåraˆyaka 
Upani∑ad 1.4.7 — to cite but one example — states: "All this was unseparated 
(indistinguishable) (avyåk®ta) [in the beginning of creation]. Then it became separated 
(distinguished) (vyåkriyata) by name and shape [so it became possible to say]: ‘This 
particular one is of the name NN and of such and such a shape.’ Therefore, even to-day 
distinction is made (vyåkriyate) by name and shape: ‘This particular one is of the name 
NN [and] of such and such a shape’." (tr. Thieme). Passages like this could be looked 
upon as the mythological counterpart of an important feature of Påˆini's grammar (and 
for the grammars that existed before him, we may assume), which shows how the now 
separated meanings and word-forms are related to each other.9 Early thinkers about 
language, we are led to believe, were interested in the details of the separation of words 
and things reported in their mythology. 
 
 
§3. Interaction with ‘etymological explanation’ (nirukta). 
 
 The background of another aspect of grammar is elucidated by its relationship 
with the Vedic auxiliary science of ‘etymological explanation’ (nirukta). This science is 
presented in a systematised form in Yåska's work called, precisely, Nirukta — a text 
which may belong to the period between Påˆini (after 350 B.C.E.) and Patañjali (around 
150 B.C.E.) —,10 but the practice of etymologizing is extremely common in the earlier 
Vedic Bråhmaˆas. These Vedic etymologies do not concern the histories of words — 
and cannot, therefore, be compared with modern linguistic etymologies —, but have 
altogether different aims. As a rule they reveal hidden connections with the 
mythological realm, which can be multiple. (In practice this means that one word can 
have several different ‘etymologies’.) Knowing them brings advantages, as does 
knowing other hidden truths. 
                                                
8 So e.g. Scharfe, 1977: 83. 
9 Bronkhorst, 1980. 
10 For the date of Påˆini, see Hinüber, 1989: 34; Falk, 1993: 304. For Patañjali's date, see Cardona, 1976: 
263 f. 
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 The ‘etymologies’ in Yåska's Nirukta are their secularised descendants. 
‘Etymologizing’ has here become a method for finding the meaning of unknown words. 
Two presuppositions underlie it: (1) The meaning of a word (primarily noun or 
adjective) is the result of a combination of the meanings of its parts. (2) The meanings 
of those parts are not assigned to them by convention, they intimately belong to them.11 
[168] 
 These same presuppositions appear to underlie Påˆini's grammar. Here, as we 
have seen (§2), constituent functional elements of words are combined, and the 
meaning of the resulting word is considered to be the combination of the meanings 
attaching to (or, in view of the above: separated from) those elements. The 
complementary character of grammar and ‘etymological explanation’ is confirmed by 
Yåska, who describes ‘etymological explanation’ in his Nirukta (1.15) as the 
‘complement of grammar’. But whereas ‘etymological explanation’ concentrates on 
cases that resist analysis, grammar normally confines itself to words the relationship of 
which with other words seems obvious and regular.12 The analytical aspect of grammar, 
the search for the constituents of words, we must conclude, derives from the 
preoccupation with ‘etymological’ connections characteristic of much of Vedic 
literature. 
 The interaction of grammar with ‘etymological explanation’ was not 
unidirectional. Yåska refers in his Nirukta to grammar, and it seems likely that Påˆini's 
A∑†ådhyåy¥ was known to him.13 He justifies the procedures of ‘etymological 
explanation’ — such as ignoring, modifying, or inverting sounds — by pointing at 
similar practices in grammar (Nirukta 2.1). It appears that ‘etymological explanation’, 
when it tried to attain the status of a science besides grammar, drew inspiration from the 
latter. 
 
 
§4. Influence from philosophy. 
 
 Påˆini's grammar shows the traces of Vedic religious thought, as we have seen. 
Philosophical systematic thought did not exist in India at his time, as far as we can tell. 
Influence from that side can be discerned in the two earliest surviving commentaries, 
Kåtyåyana's vårttikas and Patañjali's Mahåbhå∑ya, especially the latter. A systematised 
world view was being developed at that time — for the first time in India, it seems — in 
the Buddhist school called Sarvåstivåda, which was deeply interested in questions of 
                                                
11 Bronkhorst, 1981a. 
12 Bronkhorst, 1984. 
13 Thieme, 1935; Bronkhorst, 1984: 8 f. 
LINGUISTICS AND OTHER SCIENCES IN INDIA  5 
 
 
existence. For reasons connected with the historical development of Buddhism, a list of 
so-called dharmas came to be looked upon as the complete list of all there is. These 
dharmas were considered to be the ultimate constituents of persons and things. The 
persons and things themselves, being collections of dharmas, were not believed to really 
exist. Sarvåstivåda introduced a number of dharmas whose function it was to solve 
certain theoretical difficulties. Most of these theoretically useful dharmas were given a 
place in the category of dharmas called "separated from mind" (cittaviprayukta). Three 
of these dharmas are of particular interest. They are padakåya, nåmakåya and 
vyañjanakåya. This could be translated as ‘sentence’, ‘word’ and ‘phoneme’ 
respectively, where it is to be kept in mind that these linguistic units are here conceived 
of as dharmas, i.e., as partless, ultimate, really existing entities. It seems likely that 
originally — i.e., around the time of Patañjali — only two of these three dharmas were 
recognised, the word and the phoneme. 
 Possibly influenced by Sarvåstivåda, Patañjali introduces two new notions into 
grammatical discourse, adapting them to their new Brahmanical environment: the word 
and the phoneme as single, independent entities. Both are eternal, contrasting in this 
respect with the momentary Buddhist dharmas. In connection with the phoneme 
Patañjali introduces a term which will play an important role in later linguistic 
speculation: spho†a. But, as in Sarvåstivåda, the word and the phoneme are unitary, 
indivisible entities, different from the sound that expresses them.14 And where for 
Påˆini morphemes were the basic units of language, Patañjali assigns them a derived 
meaning at best.15 
 
 
§5. Language and philosophy. 
 
 The role of grammar in Indian thought has regularly been emphasised. Louis 
Renou, for example, made the often cited statement "To adhere to Indian thought means 
first of all to think like a grammarian" (Adhérer à la pensée indienne, c'est d'abord 
penser en grammairien; Renou, 1953: 86); and again: "Indian thought has as 
substructure reasonings of a grammatical nature" (La pensée indienne a pour 
substructure des raisonnements d'ordre grammatical; Renou, 1942: 164). Frits Staal, 
following D.H.H. Ingalls (1954), has made the claim that Påˆini's grammatical method 
is characteristic of much of Indian philosophy, just as Euclid's mathematical method is 
characteristic of much of Western philosophy (Staal, 1960; 1963; 1965). This is 
                                                
14 Bronkhorst, 1987. 
15 Bronkhorst, forthcoming a. 
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supposed to explain that scientific developments have taken different directions in India 
and the West. Bimal Krishna Matilal refers to the role of grammar in Indian philosophy, 
e.g., in the title of his book [169] Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian 
Philosophical Analysis (1971).  
 When it comes to substantiating these claims, one is disappointed. It is true that 
systematic abbreviations (a characteristic of Påˆini's grammar) occur in mathematics, 
astronomy, and in other grammars; that the simplicity criterion and the algebraic sËtra 
style (both also typical of Påˆini's grammar, but perhaps first used in ritual science) are 
used in many philosophical works. It is also true that grammar was part of the 
curriculum of every educated Indian, so that grammatical discussions are to be found in 
practically all commentaries, whatever the nature of the text they comment upon, and 
elsewhere.16 But does this touch the heart of the matter? Does this interest in grammar 
go beyond the correct formation of words and sentences, and affect the contents of the 
treatises concerned? There are some, but not so many cases where grammatical analysis 
is used to reach a philosophical conclusion.17 The situation is complicated by the fact 
that many Indian authors looked upon the Sanskrit language as providing preferential 
access to reality, quite independently of any considerations of grammar. Something 
must be said about this. 
 Two phases are to be distinguished. During the first one language came to be 
considered — partly no doubt under Buddhist influence — as reflecting — or even 
creating / organising — phenomenal reality. Such a position has philosophical 
consequences, which were worked out in greatest detail in the Brahmanical system of 
philosophy called Vaiße∑ika. The conviction that there is a direct correspondence 
between words and things might be called an axiom of this system. It justifies the 
ontological conclusions based on verbal usage common in the writings of this school.18 
But the influence of grammar on this school remains small. One may suspect such 
influence in its three main categories substance (dravya), quality (guˆa) and movement 
(karman), which correspond to nouns, adjectives and verbs respectively. But did the 
Vaiße∑ikas need grammar in order to arrive at this division of words? The triple division 
into nouns, adjectives and verbs is not fundamental in Påˆini's grammar. 
 The second phase is characterised by what has been called the ‘correspondence 
principle’,19 which can approximately be formulated as follows: "the words of a 
statement correspond, one by one, to the things that constitute the situation described by 
that statement". The principle is plausible in the case of many, perhaps most, 
                                                
16 Filliozat, 1988: 19 ff. 
17 For some examples, see Torella, 1987. 
18 Bronkhorst, 1992; 1996. 
19 Bronkhorst, 1996a; forthcoming. 
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statements, but leads to serious difficulties in the case of certain others. Statements of 
the form "he makes a pot" become problematic, because they do not describe a situation 
that contains a pot; the pot is still being made. These and related difficulties have been 
extensively discussed in Indian philosophical literature, and various solutions have been 
proposed and maintained by different authors and schools. Indeed, there are reasons to 
think that these discussions have led to several fundamental philosophical positions 
(such as the satkåryavåda, and the theory of denotation of certain schools), which are 
therefore based on certain views about language, not on grammar. 
 The correspondence principle is visible, perhaps for the first time, in a number 
of the contradictions presented by the Buddhist thinker Någårjuna in his important 
MËlamadhyamakakårikå (2nd cent. C.E.?). Since some of these have been claimed to 
be based on grammar, they deserve some attention. Någårjuna claims that the statement 
"[The road] that is being travelled is being travelled" (gamyamånaµ gamyate) implies 
that there must be two actions of travelling in the situation described. This is a direct 
consequence of the correspondence principle, given that the root gam "to travel" is used 
twice over in this statement. It is also a paradox, given that the statement does not 
describe a situation where there are two actions of travelling. A following verse adds 
that if there are two actions of travelling, there must be two travellers, another 
conclusion that is in contradiction with the intention of the initial statement. 
 These arguments can be satisfactorily explained with the help of the 
correspondence principle. K. Bhattacharya does not agree, and has argued in a number 
of articles that the argument of the second verse considered ("if there are two actions of 
travelling, there must be two travellers") is based on grammar.20 It is grammar which 
maintains that an action resides either in an agent or in an object, and that the activity of 
travelling, more in particular, resides in its agent. This is true, but grammar does not 
specify that two actions cannot reside in one and the same agent. This is Någårjuna's 
own [170] conclusion. The link between his argument and grammar is therefore far less 
obvious than it is claimed to be. Indeed, the only possible influence from grammar in 
these arguments is that here, exceptionally, the correspondence principle is applied to 
verbal roots rather than to whole words. 
 
 
§6. Bhart®hari. 
 
 We turn to Bhart®hari (5th cent. C.E.), the "philosopher of grammar". To what 
extent is his thought determined by grammar? We will not discuss the numerous 
                                                
20 Most recently Bhattacharya, 1995. 
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passages where Bhart®hari deals with grammatical issues, but try to determine what 
influence grammar has exerted on his philosophy as a whole. 
 This philosophy as a whole concerns the nature of reality, in which Bhart®hari, 
contrary to the Buddhists, recognises the existence of composite objects. Or rather, 
composite objects are not really composite, they are indivisible entities that exist 
besides ‘their’ parts. More precisely again, the more encompassing a thing is, the more 
it is real. Highest reality, for Bhart®hari, is the totality of all there is, has been, and will 
be. The words of language divide this reality into (not really existing) parts. 
 So far Bhart®hari's philosophy is an interesting adaptation of the ideas described 
above: the objects of phenomenal reality correspond to the words of language. New is 
that these objects are considered to be less real than their totality. This way Bhart®hari 
could do justice to some traditional Brahmanical points of view, which looked upon the 
absolute as being the totality of all there is. Influence from grammar is not obvious here. 
 It seems clear nevertheless that grammar has contributed to this vision of reality. 
Consider first that Bhart®hari applies a similar reasoning to language: words are more 
real than the constituent morphemes (mainly stems and suffixes), sentences more real 
than the words they are made up of. More exactly, words are independent entities that 
are not constituted of morphemes, and sentences are not made up of words. It is only 
through artificial analysis of words that morphemes are invented by grammarians, and 
words on the basis of sentences. 
 It is clear that Bhart®hari draws here inspiration from Patañjali's Mahåbhå∑ya 
which, perhaps under the influence of Sarvåstivåda, had given ontological priority to 
words over stems and suffixes (see above). But Bhart®hari goes further and establishes 
an ontological hierarchy: words are more real than their morphemes, sentences more 
real than their words, and the Veda as a whole more real than its sentences. Patañjali's 
argument concerning the higher ontological status of words with regard to their stems 
and suffixes, now extended, allows in this way to climb the ontological ladder, so as to 
arrive at the highest insight, which is beyond words, and which concerns undivided 
reality. This insight brings about liberation, and in this way grammar is "the door to 
liberation", as Bhart®hari puts it.21 Grammar has thus obtained an own philosophy, 
including an (in the Indian context important) liberating insight. But this philosophy is 
not based on the analysis of language implicit in Påˆini's grammar, but quite on the 
contrary on the understanding that this analysis is not ultimately "real". 
 Bhart®hari is especially remembered for his link with the spho†a, which in his 
case is primarily the indivisible word, different from the manifesting sounds. Later 
thinkers, both inside and outside the grammatical tradition, discuss and elaborate this 
                                                
21 This has been argued in Bronkhorst, 1996b; cp. Bronkhorst, 1992a. 
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concept. Modern scholars — foremost among them John Brough (1951) — see in the 
spho†a a concept of general linguistics, "simply the linguistic sign in its aspect of 
meaning-bearer (Bedeutungsträger)". In so doing they overlook the philosophical and 
ontological dimension of this concept, predominant in its original context.22 
 
 
§7. Understanding the meaning of a sentence. 
 
 There is an area of thought where Påˆini's analysis of the Sanskrit language has 
exerted a clear and unmistakable influence. It is the attempted description of the 
knowledge which a listener derives from hearing a sentence, the so-called verbal 
cognition (ßåbdabodha), which came to occupy an important place in the three schools 
of thought called M¥måµså (Vedic hermeneutics), Navya-Nyåya (the New Logic), and 
Vyåkaraˆa (grammar as a school of philosophy).23 
[171] 
 The self-imposed task of M¥måµså was to interpret Vedic sentences. Its thinkers 
had come to think that injunctions are the crucial parts of Vedic texts. These injunctions 
do not express the intention of their author, for they have none (and nor do any other 
Vedic sentences), this because the Veda was believed to have no beginning in time. 
How, then, do Vedic injunctions enjoin? Reflections of this kind led the M¥måµsakas to 
interpret, and paraphrase, the injunctions in ways that suited their purposes.24 Such 
paraphrases are already found in Íabara's M¥måµså Bhå∑ya (5th cent.?), but a 
connection with the Påˆinian analysis of words makes its appearance in a commentary 
on this work, Kumårila's Tantravårttika (7th cent.). This connection remained however 
incomplete, as can be seen from the following example. Íabara paraphrases the 
injunction svargakåmo yajeta "he who wishes to attain heaven should sacrifice" as 
yågena svargaµ bhåvayet "by means of the sacrifice he should effect [the attainment of] 
heaven", which deviates rather profoundly from the Påˆinian assignment of meanings.25 
Kumårila, presenting the position of the system (ßåstra), assigns the general meaning 
"productive operation" (bhåvanå) to the verbal ending (ta in the case of yajeta). This 
deviates from the meanings assigned to the verbal ending by Påˆini (primarily ‘agent’), 
but takes the latter's formal analysis of the verb for granted. Påˆini's formal analysis of 
the remainder of the sentence, on the other hand, does not play a role in Kumårila's 
discussions. It gains in importance in some of the subsequent refinements introduced in 
                                                
22 Bronkhorst, 1991a. 
23 For a general presentation, see Rao, 1969: esp. ch. I; Matilal, 1988; 1990: 53 f.; Coward and Kunjunni 
Raja, 1990. 
24 See Frauwallner, 1938. 
25 Íabara on M¥S 2.1.1. 
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the school.26 The constituent elements of a statement like råma˙ odanaµ pacati "Råma 
cooks rice" — råma + s -  anna + am - pac + ti — give rise to a paraphrase which gives 
each element its due, and which has the following (simplified) form: "The productive 
operation (bhåvanå; meaning of ti) happening at present, which is done through the 
instrumentality of cooking that has rice as its object goal, and this efficient force is 
qualified by Råma as its agent." 
 The M¥måµså points of view were subsequently taken into consideration, but 
combated, by Ga∫geßa, a key figure of Navya-Nyåya (14th cent.).27 He and his 
followers, too, present a paraphrase of verbal cognition which remains close to the 
Påˆinian analysis of the sentence. Indeed, the reality of Påˆinian morphemes is so much 
taken for granted by this school, that they refer to them as ‘words’ (pada). The main 
qualificand here is not the meaning of the verbal ending (as with the M¥måµsakas), but 
that of the word with the nominative ending. The meaning of the sentence råma˙ pacati 
"Råma cooks" is here approximately paraphrased as: "Råma who is qualified by the 
effort that is conducive to cooking." The verbal ending is given the meaning ‘effort’, 
which is, again, different from Påˆini's meaning ‘agent’. 
 Only the grammarians maintain the Påˆinian meaning ‘agent’ for the (active) 
verbal ending. Following Bhart®hari,28 they look upon the meaning of the verbal root as 
the main qualificand. Kauˆ∂a Bha††a (17th cent.) — an important representative of this 
school — assigns the meaning ‘activity conducive to the result’ to verbal roots; the 
substratum of the activity is the agent, the substratum of the result the object. The 
sentence "Råma cooks rice" (råma˙ odanaµ pacati) is therefore to be paraphrased, in a 
simplified manner, as: "Present activity whose substratum is Råma, which is conducive 
to the softening whose substratum is rice."29 
 In all these reflections and debates Påˆini's analysis of the Sanskrit language is 
used as point of departure, even though the meanings assigned by him to the 
morphemes are only fully accepted by the grammatical philosophers. 
 
 
§8. Conclusion. 
 
 The importance of grammar in Indian classical culture cannot be overestimated. 
The extent to which it has exerted a determining influence on the Indian sciences is less 
easy to estimate, and exaggerated assessments have become all too common. The 
                                                
26 Cp. Bhatta, 1994; Edgerton, 1929. 
27 See the description of the contents of his chapter on verbal testimony in Potter and Bhattacharyya, 
1992: 239-312, which coincides in part with Vidyabhusana, 1920. 
28 Cp. Vkp 3.8.40 ff.; tr. Bandini, 1980. 
29 Cp. Joshi, 1993; 1995 (esp. p. 22 ff.). 
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search for the fundamental nature of the Indian sciences, or of Indian thought in 
general, as being based on the supposedly all-important influence of grammar, is not 
likely to lead beyond more or less attractive slogans. This does not mean that there has 
not been intensive interaction between grammar and the other sciences, nor [172] that 
this interaction has not left its traces. Bringing those traces to light will require 
continued detailed philological research. 
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